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When invited as a member of The International Lawyer's Board of Editorial
Advisors to contribute to the Section's Tribute to Professor Sohn, I accepted out
of guilt: I had not been a student of his, although I could have been. If law
students only knew what later life would bring! As a student at the Harvard Law
School in the late 1960s when Professor Sohn was there, I was more interested
in "comparative revolutions" than I was in the law of the United Nations (or
even human rights). Reading U.N. documents, with their formal "memo-
randese" and complex document numbers, was far less exciting than reading
analyses of the withering away of capitalist legal forms in revolutionary societ-
ies. Little did I know that immediately after graduation I would spend time
reading U.N. documents as a legal advisor to the prerevolutionary Ethiopian
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and that twenty years later I would spend
most of my research energies analyzing the many U.N. background documents
for the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods.
Having accepted the invitation, I decided to choose a topic that would explore
the importance of apparently unimportant detail and formality. No commen-
tator-and I barely exaggerate-spends much time examining the "Final Pro-
visions" of international conventions. This has been especially true of the recent
conventions that I have been studying: the commercial law treaties that emanate
from the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the
Hague Conference on Private International Law, and the International Institute
for the Unification of Private Law. While the greater part of the text of these
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treaties consists of private law rules addressed to non-States or to State organs
engaged in commerce, these final provisions address States in their treaty-
making capacity. They deal with housekeeping matters (for example, designating
the depositary, prescribing rules for ratification or accession, and providing for
the effective date), the authorized reservations, and the relation of the convention
to other international agreements. Many of these issues are covered by the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and one might expect the commercial
law treaties to incorporate them.
This article examines systematically the final provisions of the international
conventions prepared by UNCITRAL. Established in 1966,2 the Commission has
prepared four conventions over the last two decades: The Convention on the
Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods (1974, as amended by a
1980 Protocol) (Limitation Convention), 3 the United Nations Convention on the
Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) (Hamburg Rules), 4 the United Nations Con-
vention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980) (Sales
Convention), 5 and the Convention on International Bills of Exchange and Inter-
national Promissory Notes (1988) (Bills Convention). 6 The first three conven-
1. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969) [hereinafter
Vienna Convention].
2. For an introduction to the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, see UNCITRAL,
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, U.N. Sales No. E.86.V.8 (1986).
The annexes to this volume reproduce the texts of the first three conventions discussed in this article.
3. Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.63/15, reprinted in United Nations Conference on Prescription (Limitation) in the Inter-
national Sale of Goods, OFFICIAL RECORDS 101-05, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.63/16 (1975). A diplomatic
conference meeting in New York adopted the final text in 1974, but the 1980 diplomatic conference
that adopted the Sales Convention (see infra note 5) also adopted a Protocol to the 1974 text to
conform the provisions of the two conventions [hereinafter Protocol]. United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, Annex It, reprinted in
United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, OFFICIAL RECORDS
191-92, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19 (1981) [hereinafter Limitation Convention]. The Protocol itself
has "Final Provisions." The convention entered into force on Aug. 1, 1988.
4. United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.89/13,
Annex 1 (1978), reprinted in United Nations Conference on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, OFFICIAL
RECORDS 148-54, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.89/14 (1981). A diplomatic conference meeting in Hamburg
adopted the final text in 1978 [hereinafter Hamburg Rules]. The convention is not yet in force. The
conference recommended that the rules be known as the "Hamburg Rules" in tribute to the fact that
they would replace the "Hague Rules" adopted in the International Convention for the Unification
of Certain Rules relating to Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 120 L.N.T.S. 305. Final Act, Annex III,
in OFFICIAL RECORDS 154.
5. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.97/18, Annex I, reprinted in United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, OFFICIAL RECORDS, 178-90 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19 (1981). A diplomatic con-
ference meeting in Vienna adopted the final text in 1980 [hereinafter Sales Convention]. The Con-
vention came into force on January 1, 1988.
6. The Convention on International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes
appears in an Annex to U.N. G.A. Res. 43/165 of Dec. 9, 1988, reprinted in [1988] XIX UNCI-
TRAL Y.B. 173 [hereinafter Bills Convention]. G.A. Res. 42/153 of Dec. 7, 1987, adopted the
procedure of review by the General Assembly. [1987] XVIII UNCITRAL Y.B. 43 (decision to create
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tions were adopted at diplomatic conferences convoked by the United Nations
General Assembly, and the United Nations has published the official records of
these conferences.7 Due to budget constraints, the last of these conventions,
rather than being adopted at a diplomatic conference, was approved on Decem-
ber 9, 1988, by a resolution of the General Assembly following review of the
UNCITRAL draft by the Assembly's Sixth Committee. The United Nations has
not yet published a single-volume equivalent of the official records available for
the other conventions. 8
When starting the background research for this article I was curious about
whether any of the final provisions had been subject to serious debate. I expected
that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties would have a significant
influence on the content and wording of these provisions. Indeed, I assumed that
most of the clauses were boilerplate, but thought that if they were not they would
become so as subsequent UNCITRAL conventions copied earlier ones. Aside
from debate over what reservations would be authorized, I did not anticipate
overtly political debate. In sum, I had no hypothesis to test; I was driven solely
by curiosity about what commentators might miss if they slighted the final
provisions. What follows summarizes what I found.
I. Scope of Final Provisions
The conventions do not all package the final provisions in the same way. The
Limitation Convention (Parts II-IV) distinguishes between "Implementation,"
"Declarations and Reservations," and "Final Clauses." The Hamburg Rules
(Parts VI and VII) distinguish between "Supplementary Provisions" and "Final
Clauses," while the Sales Convention (Part IV), the Protocol to the Limitation
Convention, and the Bills Convention (Chapter IX) only have "Final Provi-
sions." However packaged, these provisions have the common trait that they are
addressed to the States in their treaty-making capacity. Both the recognition of
this common trait and the lack of a need to make the refined classification of the
Limitation Convention probably explain the evolution towards the simplification
in packaging.
The crucial step in this evolution came between the Limitation Convention and
the Hamburg Rules. Of the Limitation Convention's three articles dealing with
a working group within the framework of the Sixth Committee to meet at the beginning of the
General Assembly's Forty-Third Session for a maximum of two weeks). See also UNCITRAL's
discussion of procedure at its 20th session in 1987. Id. at 33, paras. 300-03. The convention is not
yet in force.
7. See supra notes 3-5 for the official citations to the Official Records.
8. The summary records of the UNCITRAL debates discussing the text of the draft convention
appear in the 1986 and 1987 UNCITRAL Yearbooks. The relevant summary record of discussion of
the draft final clauses (U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/SR.385) is set out in [1987] XVIII UNCITRAL Y.B.
186-90. Documents of the General Assembly relative to the adoption of the Convention on Inter-
national Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes are reprinted in [1988] XIX UNCI-
TRAL Y.B. 187.
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implementation of the convention, the Hamburg Rules omit two and consolidate
the third in an article defining when the convention entered into force. 9 As for
reservations, whereas the Limitation Convention allows four reservations and
requires six articles to so provide, the Hamburg Rules prohibit reservations in a
single article. 1o Consequently, the Hamburg Rules are able to eliminate, without
difficulty, the separate two parts of the Limitation Convention dealing with
"Implementation" and "Declarations and Reservations," respectively. The
Hamburg Rules do include a separate Part VI on "Supplementary Provisions,"
but Part VI's four articles deal with particular problems associated with prior
shipping legislation, and only one of these-article 25 (the relation of the Ham-
burg Rules to other conventions)-deals with a topic that appears in the final
provisions of the other conventions. 1 The Sales Convention continues to sim-
plify the presentation of the final provisions by lumping them together in an
unclassified final part called "Final Provisions." The Bills Convention adopts,
without debate, the same approach.
II. Adoption of the Final Provisions
Steps for drafting and adoption of the UNCITRAL conventions have followed
the same basic pattern. For each project, the U.N. Commission delegated to a
Working Group the task of preparing a draft convention for consideration by the
Commission at one or more of its annual meetings. In turn, preparation of the
initial draft was usually delegated to the UNCITRAL Secretariat. After debating
the draft text submitted by the Working Group and after taking into account
comments from governments or other international bodies, the Commission ap-
proved a draft and recommended to the United Nations General Assembly that it
convene a diplomatic conference (or, in the case of the Bills Convention, the
General Assembly itself) to adopt an official text. If the General Assembly
acquiesced, as it invariably did, the Commission circulated the draft text and
supporting documents to governments and interested international organizations
for their comments. 12 The subsequent conference considered the circulated doc-
9. The Hamburg Rules omit arts. 31 (federal state article) & 32 (applicable law in jurisdiction
where different systems of law might apply) of the Limitation Convention. The Hamburg Rules
consolidate the substance of art. 33 (nonapplicability as to prior contracts) of the Limitation Con-
vention with the Hamburg Rules provision on entry into force, art. 30.
10. Limitation Convention, supra note 3, arts. 34-40; Hamburg Rules, supra note 4, art. 29.
The Sales and Bills Conventions pick up some of the Limitation Convention's articles in its "Dec-
larations and Reservations" Part, but the later conventions incorporate these provisions in the general
catch all "Final Provisions."
11. Hamburg Rules, supra note 4, arts. 23-26. Art. 23 prohibits contractual stipulations that
derogate from the Convention's provisions; art. 24 allows the continued application of rules regard-
ing adjustment for general average; and art. 26 defines a "unit of account" to permit adjustment of
the prior articles limiting liability (e.g., art. 6).
12. For a more detailed description of the procedure within the Commission, see UNCITRAL,
supra note 2, at 8-11.
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uments and the comments on them in its deliberations. The conference typically
divided into two main committees open to all participants, and the reports of
these committees were reviewed at plenary sessions. The final text was then
opened for signature and ratification or accession. 13
With respect to adoption of the conventions' final provisions, the Commission
played a less important role, and the Secretariat a correspondingly more impor-
tant role. The U.N. Secretary-General, acting through the Secretariat, prepared
the draft of the final provisions at the formal request of the Commission or one
of its Working Groups. 14 The Secretariat's drafts reflected considerable caution.
They frequently included bracketed material (especially to indicate proposed
dates, but sometimes to highlight potentially controversial proposed articles), 15
occasionally set out alternative drafts of more controversial articles, 16 often
indicated the provenance of the proposed articles, 17 and included commentary
13. The diplomatic conferences adopted at a plenary session the rules of procedure for that
conference. See, e.g., Limitation Convention, supra note 3, at xiii.
14. The public record for the Limitation Convention does not state expressly that the Secretariat
prepared the text of the final clauses, but does note that the Working Group did not consider them.
"In response to the Commission's request, the Working Group completed the final draft of a
convention on prescription (limitation), in the field of international sale of goods; the text appears as
annex I .... The provision of part IV, final clauses, were not considered by the Working Group."
Report of the Working Group on Time-limits and Limitations (Prescription) in the International Sale
of Goods on its third session para. 8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/70 (1971), reprinted in [1972] III UNCI-
TRAL Y.B. 109, 110 [hereinafter Report of Working Group]. Note, however, that the Working Group
did consider the draft articles on implementation, declarations, and reservations. See supra notes
9-10. The first draft of the final provisions was published in an Annex I of the Working Group's
report on its third session as part of the draft convention. [1972] III UNCITRAL Y.B. 109, 114.
The record for the other conventions is clearer because the Secretary-General or Secretariat
published the draft provisions in separate documents. Report of the Secretary-General: draft Con-
vention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea; draft provisions concerning implementation, reservations
and otherfinal clauses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/115 (1976), reprinted in [1976] VII UNCITRAL Y.B.
299; Report of the Secretary-General: draft Convention on the International Sale of Goods; draft
articles concerning implementation and other final clauses, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 9/135 (1977), re-
printed in 11977] VIII UNCITRAL Y. B. 164; Draft Convention on International Bills of Exchange
and International Promissory Notes: draft final clauses: note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.33 (1987), reprinted in [1987] XVIII UNCITRAL Y.B. 99 [hereinafter Note by
the Secretariat].
15. See, e.g., draft art. 42 (1) of the Limitation Convention: "The present Convention shall enter
into force [six months] after the date of the deposit of the [ ] instrument of ratification or acces-
sion." Report of Working Group, supra note 14, Annex I, at 114.
For use of brackets to highlight a potentially controversial article, see Bills Convention, supra
note 6, draft arts. 82, 85, & 87. Note by the Secretariat, supra note 14, at 99-100 (relation to other
conventions; prohibition of reservations; effective date).
16. See, e.g., draft art. 44 of the Limitation Convention which proposes, with footnotes indi-
cating provenance, Alternative A and Alternative B with respect to a declaration on territorial
application. Report of Working Group, supra note 14, Annex 1, at 114. Objections from delegates
arguing that the article was a remnant of colonialism ultimately led to deletion of this proposed
article. Summary Record of first meeting of Second Committee, paras. 55-78, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.63/C.2/SR. 1, reprinted in Limitation Convention, supra note 3, at 248-49.
17. Footnotes to the draft of the Limitation Convention's final provisions indicate, for example,
that they are based on the final clauses of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the 1964
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explaining the reason for a proposal. 18 The drafts, however, followed no single
pattern. The most careful draft was for the Sales Convention: the Secretariat
indicated sources in prior conventions and provided ample commentary. The
other drafts were not as systematic. The Limitation Convention had footnotes
indicating sources, but did not have a complete commentary; the Hamburg Rules
had only a few footnotes and no commentary; and the Bills Convention stated
summarily that the articles were modelled on the Sales Convention.
With the exception of several persistent issues, neither the Commission's
Working Groups' 9 nor the Commission itself debated the final provisions at
length. The Commission's final report on the Limitation Convention carefully
noted that "(tihe following articles were not considered by the Commission and
it was agreed that they should be submitted for consideration to the proposed
International Conference of Plenipotentiaries. 20 With respect to the Hamburg
Rules and Sales Convention, the Commission affirmatively decided that the
conference of plenipotentiaries was a more appropriate body to review the final
provisions. 2 ' The Commission, however, debated at greater length the draft final
provisions of the Bills Convention, perhaps because of concern about whether
Hague Sales Convention. The footnotes to draft arts. 39-42 (arts. 41-44 of the final text) state, for
example, that they are based on arts. 81-84 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, while
draft arts. 43-45 are based on arts. Xli, XIII, and XV of the Hague Convention relating to a Uniform
Law on the International Sale of Goods. Report of Working Group, supra note 14, Annex I, at 114.
18. See, e.g., the comments to the Sales Convention. Report of the Secretary-General: draft
Convention on the International Sale of Goods, draft articles concerning implementation and other
final clauses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/135 (1977), reprinted in [1977] VIII UNCITRAL Y.B. 164.
19. In the cases of the Hamburg Rules and Sales Convention, the Working Groups requested that
the draft be submitted to the Commission without review by the Working Group; in the case of the
Bills Convention, the Commission requested that the Secretariat submit the draft to the Working
Group, but there is no record that the Working Group reviewed the draft. See Report of the Working
Group on International Legislation on Shipping on the work of the eighth session, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/105 (1975), reprinted in [1975] VI UNCITRAL Y.B. 222, 245 ("The Working Group did
not consider draft provisions concerning implementation, declarations and reservations, or final
clauses for the draft Convention. It requested the Secretariat to prepare draft articles dealing with
these topics for consideration by the Commission at its ninth session."); Report of the Working Group
on the International Sale of Goods on the work of its seventh session, para. 11, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/116 (1976), reprinted in [1976] VII UNCITRAL Y.B. 88; Report of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its nineteenth session, para. 223, U.N. Doc.
A/41/17 (1986), reprinted in [19861 XVII UNCITRAL Y.B. 3, 29.
20. Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its fifth
session, para. 22, U.N. Doc. A/8717 (1972), reprinted in [1972] III UNCITRAL Y.B. 9, 15.
2 1. Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its
ninth session, Annex 1, Draft provisions concerning implementation, reservations and other final
clauses, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/31/17, reprinted in [1976] VII UNCITRAL Y.B. 9, 65 [hereinafter
Report of Commission's ninth session] (Commission, meeting as a Committee of the Whole, took no
action with respect to the final provisions "on the ground that they could best be considered at the
conference on plenipotentiaries that will be convened to adopt the convention on the carriage of
goods by sea"). See also Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on
the work of its tenth session, Annex 1, paras. 558-59, U.N. Doc. A/32/17 (1977), reprinted in [1977]
VIII UNCITRAL Y.B. 11, 64 (Sales Convention) [hereinafter Report on Trade Law tenth session].
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there was to be a diplomatic conference to review these provisions. 22 The Com-
mission most often debated those draft provisions that dealt with possible res-
ervations and the relation of the draft convention with prior conventions. For
each of the conventions, however, the Commission concluded by requesting that
the Secretariat revise its draft in the light of Commission debates and circulate
the draft with the other documents to governments and interested international
organizations. 23 When there had been debate within the Commission, the Sec-
retariat was equally cautious in the preparation of this new draft text. For ex-
ample, the two alternative formulae proposed to govern when the Hamburg
Rules would come into force became six alternatives in the draft that was cir-
culated and then submitted to the diplomatic conference.2 4 As a consequence,
each diplomatic conference convoked by the U.N. General Assembly had before
it not only the Secretariat's draft of the final provisions, but also an analysis of
the responses of governments and international organizations to the draft con-
vention as a whole. These responses, however, rarely commented on the final
provisions.2 5
In the case of the first three conventions, the diplomatic conference, at the
beginning of its deliberations, assigned the final clauses to the second of two
committees. At each conference the Second Committee met significantly less
often than the First Committee. At the conference on the Sales Convention, for
22. At the 1987 meeting of the Commission, the observer for Venezuela:
doubted that the Commission was the proper forum for consideration of the final
clauses of an international convention. Such clauses involved issues which were
political in nature and should, in his view, be considered by the General Assembly or
by a plenipotentiary conference. Since, however, the majority of members appeared
to deem it appropriate that the Commission should consider the final clauses in the
present instance, his delegation would refrain from raising a formal objection.
Summary Record of the 379th Meeting of UNCITRAL, para. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SR.379, re-
printed in [1987] XVIII UNCITRAL Y.B. 168 [hereinafter 379th Meeting of UNCITRAL].
23. See, e.g., Report of Commission's ninth session, supra note 21, para. 42, at 14 which states:
In regard to the draft provisions concerning implementation, reservations, and other
final clauses for the draft Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/115), the Commission decided that these draft provisions, as modified by the
Secretariat in conformity with the proposals adopted by Committee I, should be
circulated, together with the draft Convention, to Governments and interested inter-
national organizations for comments and proposals.
24. Text of the Provisions of the Draft Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea Concerning
Implementation, Reservations and other Final Clauses prepared by the Secretary-General, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.89/6 and Add. I & 2, reprinted in Hamburg Rules, supra note 4, at 11, 13-15.
25. In the case of the Sales Convention, the Secretariat's draft final provisions had not reached
Governments in time for detailed study and comment. Analysis of comments and proposals by
Governments and international organizations on the draft Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, and on the draft provisions concerning implementation, reservations and other
final clauses prepared by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/9 (1980), reprinted in Sales
Convention, supra note 5, at 82 ("Even though [the Secretary-General's report on draft provisions
concerning implementation] had not been published at the time comments and proposals were
requested, comments were received from several States").
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example, the Second Committee met only nine times, while the First Committee
met thirty-eight times. 26 In general, the Second Committee considered and
adopted a proportionately higher number of amendments for the final provisions
than for the other articles. By my count, for example, delegates to the conference
on the Sales Convention proposed twenty-nine amendments, of which the con-
ference adopted sixteen, rejected eight, sent two to the drafting committee, and
permitted the withdrawal of three. 27 During the Second Committee's consider-
ation of the final provisions of each convention representatives of the Secretariat
28played an important role by clarifying points of international treaty practice.
After the two committees had completed their deliberations on a convention,
the conference reviewed the committee reports at plenary meetings, with review
of the Second Committee's report following debate on the report of the First
Committee. Although under pressure to complete work, each conference adopted
a surprising number of amendments to the final provisions. The most dramatic of
these last-minute amendments was the addition of article 95 to the Sales Con-
vention to permit States to declare that they would not be bound by article 1(1 )(b)
and thereby limit the Convention's application.
29
III. Content of Final Provisions
The final provisions in these UNCITRAL conventions fall into five categories:
"housekeeping" provisions; provisions for the implementation of the conven-
tions; reservations; provisions defining the relation of the conventions to prior
and subsequent international agreements; and provisions on revision and amend-
ment of the conventions.
A. HOUSEKEEPING PROVISIONS
Each convention contains provisions informing States where, when, and how
to become a party to the convention (Contracting State). These articles designate
the depositary; prescribe rules on signature, ratification, and accession; prescribe
rules for declarations; designate the effective date; provide procedures for de-
26. Sales Convention, supra note 5, at 236-433, 434-80. (The number of meetings that the
Second Committee devoted to the Sales Convention is approximately six because the Second Com-
mittee also considered the proposed Protocol to the 1974 Limitation Convention at the sixth through
ninth meetings.)
27. Winship, The Scope of the Vienna Convention on International Sales Contracts, in INTER-
NATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS 1, 40 n.86 (N. Galston & H. Smit eds. 1984).
28. See, e.g., the comment by the Executive Secretary of the Conference on the Limitation
Convention calling attention to General Assembly resolutions. First meeting of the Second Com-
mittee, para. 3 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.63/C.2/SR. 1, reprinted in Limitation Convention, supra note
3, at 247.
29. Eleventh plenary meeting, paras. 78-98, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.63/SR. ll, reprinted in Sales
Convention, supra note 5, at 229-30.
VOL. 24, NO. 3
UNCITRAL'S INT'L COMMERCIAL LAW CONVENTIONS 719
nunciation; and conclude with an authentic text and witness clause (the testimo-
nium). With minor exceptions, each convention has each of these "housekeep-
ing" provisions.30
Of all the final provisions, these articles are the closest to boilerplate (that is,
unbargained-for contract language). 3 1 By comparing texts, one can easily trace
the evolution of each of the final provisions. The last of the conventions, the Bills
Convention, copies almost verbatim the related final provisions from the Sales
Convention. 32 The Sales Convention, in turn, draws upon the final clauses of
both the Hamburg Rules and the Limitation Convention. 33The Hamburg Rules
simplify some of the Limitation Convention's final clauses, while the Limitation
Convention itself looks for models to the final clauses in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties and the 1964 Hague Sales Convention.
34
At some point in the evolution of each final provision, a conference debated
its form and content. Consider, for example, the innocuous article designating
the United Nations Secretary-General as the depositary. Articles 42 and 43 of the
Limitation Convention cover ratification and accession, respectively. The second
sentence in these two articles states "It]he instruments of [ratification/accession]
shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations." Article 27
of the Hamburg Rules simplifies this form by stating in a single, separate article
that "The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the
depositary of this Convention." The reason given by the Secretariat for this
change was "that the text before the committee had been drafted in the simplest
form possible because the procedures relating to the functions of the depositary
were already well-established under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
30. Not all commentators would agree on this list of housekeeping provisions. Mr. Kritzer, for
example, omits the entry into force and declarations clauses from his list. A. KRITZER, GUIDE TO
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNA-
TIONAL SALE OF GOODS 558-60 (1989).
31. B. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 90 (1987) defines "boilerplate" as
"ready-made or all-purpose language that will fit a variety of contexts." The origin appears to be
"syndicated material supplied esp. to weekly newspapers in matrix or plate form." WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED 247 (1986) (defin. 2 a).
32. "The draft final clauses set forth in this note are modelled on the final provisions of the
[Sales Convention]." Note by the Secretariat, supra note 14, para. 2. The draft did not include the
equivalent of Sales Convention, art. 97 (declarations), presumably because the draft did not con-
template that reservations would be permitted. The final text, however, permits one reservation but
still does not provide for declarations. Bills Convention, supra note 6, art. 88(l).
33. The Secretariat indicates the sources of the draft final clauses in footnotes to the draft text
submitted to the Sales Conference. Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods: Draft Articles Concerning Implementation, Declarations, Reservations and Other Clauses,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/6 (1979), reprinted in Sales Convention, supra note 5, at 66-70.
34. Footnotes to the draft text submitted to the Limitation Conference indicate that the drafters
looked to arts. 81-84 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and arts. XII, XIII, and XV
of the Hague Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods. Text of the
Draft Convention on Prescription (Limitation) in the International Sale of Goods arts. 39-46, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.63/4 (1974), reprinted in Limitation Convention, supra note 3, at 4, 9-10.
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Treaties." 35 Article 89 of the Sales Convention and article 85 of the Bills
Convention adopt the Hamburg Rules formulation with the drafting refinement
that "for this Convention" is substituted for "of this Convention."
While the Limitation and Hamburg conferences did not discuss these changes
in language, there was debate at the conferences about whether the conventions
should spell out the duties of the depositary. The original draft submitted to the
Limitation conference included an article requiring the Secretary-General to give
Contracting Parties notices received pursuant to other articles. The conference
rejected the article because it was not exhaustive and might therefore be read to
be restrictive, and because a depositary's functions were spelled out in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 36 At the Hamburg conference the
Indian delegate objected that the draft article was incomplete without a descrip-
tion of the functions of the depositary, and, together with the Ecuadorian dele-
gate, he proposed the addition of the clause "and he shall discharge all the
functions of a depositary" to make clear that the functions of a depositary as
spelled out in article 77 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties were
vested exclusively in the Secretary-General. After numerous comments, the
Second Committee rejected the Indian-Ecuadorian proposal as unnecessary and
not an improvement on the draft text.37
Similar examples can be given from the evolution of the other housekeeping
provisions. In some cases subsequent changes added a gloss, rather than sim-
plifying the text used as a model. When introducing a new subarticle (3) to
article 93 (federal state clause) of the Sales Convention, for example, the Ca-
nadian delegate noted that the new paragraph clarified the term "Contracting
State" when used in the context of the federal state clause and therefore im-
proved the Limitation Convention article used as a model.3 s
Debate on these housekeeping provisions was relatively benign. The principal
exception was the politically charged debate on when the Hamburg Rules should
come into force. For each convention there was debate about how many States
must become a party before the convention would come into force, but debate
was about the number of States rather than the formula itself. For the Hamburg
35. First meeting of the Second Committee, para. 19, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.89/C.2/SR.I, re-
printed in Hamburg Rules, supra note 4, at 373.
36. First meeting of the Second Committee, paras. 79-83, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.63/C.2/SR.I,
reprinted in Limitation Convention, supra note 3, at 249. The U.K. delegate noted very carefully,
however, that the Vienna Convention was not yet in force. Id. para. 82.
37. First meeting of the Second Committee, para. 17, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.89/C.2/SR.Iand
second meeting of the Second Committee, paras. 7-24, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/C.2/SR.2, reprinted
in Hamburg Rules, supra note 4, at 373, 375-76. In the course of debate the Chairman, Mr. Popov
of Bulgaria, "wondered whether the Conference had the right to inform the Secretary-General that
he must perform the functions of a depositary and to tell him what those functions were. The
Secretary-General could surely be assumed to know what functions he was expected to perform as
depositary." Id. para. 9.
38. Third meeting of the Second Committee, para. 25, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C.2/SR.3,
reprinted in Sales Convention, supra note 5, at 445. For unexplained reasons, the Bills Convention
omits this gloss in art. 87.
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Rules, however, the Secretariat and UNCITRAL presented the conference with
six alternatives, some of which included complex formulae taken from prior
shipping conventions to ensure that the convention would not come into effect
without the participation of at least some States with large merchant fleets.
39
Proponents of an alternative that would make entry into force dependent only on
the number of Contracting States spoke of the need to ensure that carrier nations
would not have a veto power over the coming into force of the convention.40
Calling attention to the recent General Assembly resolution on the Establishment
of a New International Economic Order, the Indian delegate suggested that a
formula based on the size of a Contracting State's merchant fleet would undercut
the convention's attempt to "strike an equitable balance between the interests of
shippers and of carriers. '"4' The conference ultimately adopted the simpler for-
mula requiring only a specified number of Contracting States, but made that
number twenty rather than ten, the figure used in the other conventions.42
B. IMPLEMENTATION
4 3
With the exception of a "federal State" clause, the conventions do not state
what steps a Contracting State must take in order to bring the conventions into
force within their territory. The draft Limitation Convention included an article
to this effect, but the diplomatic conference voted to delete the article as super-
fluous because the international law principle of pacta sunt servanda requires
Contracting States to ensure that a treaty is observed. 44 None of the other con-
ventions returns to this earlier draft.
39. Report of the Second Committee, paras. 29-35, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.89/l 1, reprinted in
Hamburg Rules, supra note 4, at 125, 128-31. Two of the six alternatives defined the relation of the
Hamburg Rules to the existing Hague Rules.
40. Fourth meeting of the Second Committee, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.89/C.2/SR.4,
reprinted in Hamburg Rules, supra note 4, at 380 (remark of Indonesian delegate).
41. Id. para. 10, at 381.
42. Hamburg Rules, supra note 4, art. 30(l). See eleventh meeting of the Second Committee,
para. 49, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.89/C.2/SR. 11, reprinted in id. at 404.
43. Part 1I of the Limitation Convention includes three articles under the rubric "Implementa-
tion": a federal state clause discussed in the text infra; an article on the applicable law in federal and
non-unitary States with more than one system of law; and an article on what contracts will be
governed by the convention. Limitation Convention, supra note 3, arts. 31-33. The United States
proposed the second of these articles, art. 32, which reads: "Where in this Convention reference is
made to the law of a State in which different systems of law apply, such reference shall be construed
to mean the law of the particular legal system concerned." See Smit, The Convention on the
Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods: UNCITRAL's First-Born, 23 AM. J. COMP. L.
337, 351 (1975) ("While this direction is not particularly clear, it has the merit of recognizing the
problem and of indicating the proper approach towards its solution"). This article has disappeared
without a trace and without explanation.
44. Text of the Draft Convention on Prescription (Limitation) in the International Sale of Goods,
art. 30, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.63/4, reprinted in Limitation Convention, supra note 3, at 4, 8:
[Implementing Legislation]
[Subject to the provisions of article 31, each Contracting State shall take such steps as
may be necessary under its constitution or law to give the provisions of Part I of this
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A recurring issue has been how to implement the conventions within federal
States whose constitutions limit the authority of the federal government with
respect to the subject matter covered by the conventions. Canada, as the State
most concerned, has been the principal proponent of a "federal State" clause. At
the Limitation conference the Canadian delegate noted that:
under the Canadian Constitution, which conferred upon the provinces exclusive power
to legislate in private and commercial matters, the federal Parliament could not pass
laws directly on such matters as prescription. However, only Canada as a sovereign
State had access to international forums and could participate in international treaties.
Canada wanted a uniform law on the subject and did not wish to have any special
privilege.4 5
When presenting his delegation's proposed text of the federal State clause, the
Canadian delegate stressed that the proposal was "patterned closely on similar
clauses in existing conventions and therefore should not raise too many
difficulties."
46
The text proposed by Canada became article 31 of the Limitation Convention:
1. If a Contracting State has two or more territorial units in which, according to its
constitution, different systems of law are applicable in relation to the matters dealt with
in this Convention, it may, at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare
that this Convention shall extend to all its territorial units or only to one or more of
them, and may amend its declaration by submitting another declaration at any time.
2. This declaration shall be notified to the Secretary-General of the United Nations
and shall state expressly the territorial units to which the Convention applies.
3. If a Contracting State described in paragraph (1) of this article makes no decla-
ration at the time of signature, ratification or accession, the Convention shall have effect
within all territorial units of that State.
Article 31 has served as the model for similar provisions in the Sales and Bills
Conventions.
Convention the force of law not later than the date of the entry into force of this
Convention in respect of that State.]
First meeting of the Second Committee, paras. 5-13, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.63/C. 2/SR. I, reprinted in
id. at 245 (art. 30 deleted).
45. Fourth meeting of the Second Committee, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.63/C.2/SR.4, re-
printed in Limitation Convention, supra note 3, at 251. See Leal, Federal State Clauses and the
Conventions of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 8 DALHOUSIE L.J. 257 (1984).
46. Second meeting of the Second Committee, para. 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.63/C.2/SR.2,
reprinted in Limitation Convention, supra note 3, at 250. (The Canadian delegate later cited as
precedents some Hague Conventions. Tenth plenary meeting, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.63/
SR. 10, reprinted in Limitation Convention, supra note 3, at 130.) At the fourth meeting of the
Second Committee, the Canadian delegate noted:
Although the amendment was closely patterned on similar provisions in earlier con-
ventions, two changes had been introduced. One was the addition of the third para-
graph, the purpose of which was to clarify the situation that would apply in the case
of States under whose Constitution the central Government had power to legislate on
all matters. The purpose of the second change was to make it clear that the different
systems of law applicable in the various territorial units must be based on the Con-
stitution of the federal State.
Fourth meeting of the Second Committee, para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.63/C.2/SR.2, reprinted in
Limitation Convention, supra note 3, at 251.
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Initial debate over this article was heated. At the Limitation conference the
U.S.S.R. delegate urged its deletion:
While any State might have its own specific problems connected with domestic legis-
lation, all States acceding to an international treaty must nevertheless ensure obser-
vance of the treaty on an equal basis. The proposed article would lead to the granting
of a privileged position to federal States, as opposed to unitary States, which would be
contrary to the principle of the sovereign equality of States.47
The delegate later argued that the Canadian draft text was inconsistent with
article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which makes treaties
applicable to the entire territory of Contracting States. 48 The Czechoslovak del-
egate objected that the broadly-drafted text was a reversion to objectionable
clauses providing for colonial territories that the conference had already
rejected, 49 while the Indian delegate suggested that the proposal might lead to
intervention into the internal affairs of other States.5°
Despite these objections, the Second Committee at the Limitation conference
adopted the Canadian proposal by fifteen votes to eleven, with two abstentions,
5 1
and the conference itself adopted the text by twenty-three votes to ten, with one
abstention. 52 At the time of the latter vote, the Australian delegate stated that his
delegation "regarded the clause as being inappropriately drafted and not to be
taken as a model for future conventions.
' 53
Despite Australian concerns, article 31 of the Limitation Convention is the
model for similar articles in the Sales and Bills Conventions.54 The Secretariat
submitted two draft alternatives to the Sales conference, one modelled on article
47. First meeting of the Second Committee, para. 14, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.63/C.2/SR.I, re-
printed in Limitation Convention, supra note 3, at 245. See also id. para. 23, at 246.
48. Fourth meeting of the Second Committee, para. 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.63/C.2/SR.4,
reprinted in Limitation Convention, supra note 3, at 252. The U.K. delegate responded to the
U.S.S.R. delegate by noting that art. 29 of the Vienna Convention itself provided that its rule did not
apply if a treaty provided otherwise. Id. para. 15.
49. Id. para. 6, at 251. The conference rejected draft art. 44 [Declaration on territorial appli-
cation], which made the convention applicable, in one alternative, to "all or any of the territories for
whose international relations it is responsible," or, in the other alternative, to "all non-metropolitan
territories for the international relations of which any Party is responsible." Text of the Draft
Convention on Prescription (Limitation) in the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.63/4 (1974), reprinted in Limitation Convention, supra note 10. The Second Committee
rejected the draft article at its first meeting. First meeting of the Second Committee, paras. 55-78,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.63/C.2/SR. 1, reprinted in Limitation Convention, supra note 3, at 248-49.
50. Fourth meeting of the Second Committee, para. 20, reprinted in Limitation Convention,
supra note 3, at 252.
51. Id. para. 38, at 253.
52. Tenth plenary meeting, para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.63/SR. 10, reprinted in Limitation
Convention, supra note 3, at 130.
53. Ninth plenary meeting, para. 53, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.63/SR.9, reprinted in Limitation
Convention, supra note 3, at 129.
54. Presumably because maritime matters fall within the Canadian federal government's author-
ity, Canada did not press for retention of the draft federal state clause in the Hamburg Rules. Seventh
meeting of the Second Committee, para. 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.89/C.2/SR.7, reprinted in Hamburg
Rules, supra note 4, at 390.
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31 and the other on article 11 of the Convention on the Recovery Abroad of
Maintenance. 55 Canada favored the former alternative, while Australia favored
the latter alternative, which merely required a federal government to recommend
favorable action to federal units that had competence to act on the subject matter
of the convention and to inform the depositary about the status of the convention
in the different federal units. The Second Committee appointed the two delega-
tions to a working group, and the group ultimately endorsed the Canadian pro-
posal, with an additional paragraph to fill a gap in the original text. The Sales
conference adopted this proposal both for the Sales Convention and for the
Protocol amending the Limitation Convention.5 6 The Bills Convention, on the




Each of the four conventions prohibits Contracting States from making reser-
vations other than those specifically authorized by the convention itself. The
Hamburg Rules prohibit reservations altogether; the Bills Convention allows
only one; the Limitation and Sales Conventions permit four each-or five each,
if one also counts the federal State clause as a reservation. 58
The decision to prohibit reservations other than those specifically authorized
was not uncontroversial. The Limitation conference first adopted a motion to
delete the proposed prohibition, but then reversed itself. 59 The motion was made
by a delegate from the U.S.S.R. on the ground that article 19 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties adequately dealt with the matter by prohib-
iting reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of a convention. 60 In
55. Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance, June 20, 1956, art. 11,268 U.N.T.S. 3.
Report on Trade Law, tenth session, supra note 21, Annex 1, para. 560, at 65: "The Committee
also recommends that the Commission request the secretariat to invite federal and non-unitary States
to indicate their views on the desirability of a federal State clause in the Convention on the International
Sale of Goods. The representative of Australia indicated his reservation on this point." The report does
not indicate the ground for the Australian reservation.
56. Sales Convention, supra note 5, art. 93; Protocol, supra note 3, art. III. The stated reason
for the addition of the new paragraph was that:
in the absence of a provision such as that contained in the proposed new paragraph,
article I(l)(a), could cause the Convention to apply to a contract between a party in
a unitary Contracting State and a party in a territorial unit of a federal Contracting
State, even though the Convention did not extend to that unit.
Third meeting of the Second Committee, para. 25, U.N. Doc, A/CONF.97/C.2/SR.3, reprinted in
Sales Convention, supra note 5, at 445.
57. Bills Convention, supra note 6, art. 87.
58. Limitation Convention, supra note 3, art. 39; Hamburg Rules, supra note 4, art. 29; Sales
Convention, supra note 5, art. 98; Bills Convention, supra note 6, art. 88.
59. Tenth plenary meeting, paras. 34-56, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.63/SR. 10, reprinted in Limita-
tion Convention, supra note 3, at 132-34.
60. Id. para. 43. Art. 19 of the Vienna Convention provides:
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response it was pointed out that it would be very difficult for business enterprises
to ascertain what reservations were in effect in any particular country, and that
the proposal might permit States to adopt reservations expressly rejected by the
conference. 6' At the Hamburg conference there was little opposition to the
prohibition of reservations because to allow reservations might undermine the
delicate compromise between the shipping and carrier States represented by the
substantive rules of the convention. 62 With less debate, the Sales conference
adopted the prohibition because to allow reservations would undermine unifor-
mity and create uncertainty. 63 A similar prohibition in the draft Bills Convention,
however, ran into trouble in the UNCITRAL deliberations on the ground that
States should not be limited as to the reservations they might wish to make. 64
Again, the argument that business enterprises would face severe difficulties in
the absence of a prohibition carried the day.
65
As one would expect, and the conference records bear out, the conventions
only permit reservations with respect to issues that could not be resolved by
debate. Some reservations relate to a convention's sphere of application, while
others preserve particular doctrines or institutions strongly desired by particular
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty,
formulate a reservation unless:
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
(b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the
reservation in question, may be made; or
(c) in cases not falling under subparagraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incom-
patible with the object and purpose of the treaty.
Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 19.
61. See, e.g., tenth plenary meeting, para. 51 reprinted in Limitation Convention, supra note 3.
"States would in practice to some extent be able to make the reservations they wished, including
those which they had proposed to the Conference and which had been rejected by vote. . . .[Airticle
39 was essential for both businessmen and lawyers because it was unfair to expect them to spend time
and money finding out whether and on what terms a particular State was a party to the Convention."
Id. para. 53.
62. See generally Summary Records of37th meeting of the First Committee, paras. 12-30, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.89/C. 1/SR.37, reprinted in Hamburg Rules, supra note 4, at 367-68. See, e.g., id.
para. 25 ("the very purpose of the Convention, which was to codify international law in the matter
and to introduce uniformity, would be undermined").
63. See generally sixth meeting of the Second Committee, paras. 9-22, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.97/C.2/SR.6, reprinted in Sales Convention, supra note 5, at 458-59. See, e.g., id. para.
9 ("[Ilt was important not to allow reservations to be made to the Convention since they would
weaken it and give rise to uncertainty.... [T~he lack of any provision that no other reservations were
permissible would enable a State to make a reservation to any article as it saw fit.").
64. See generally 379th Meeting of UNCITRAL, supra note 22, paras. 11-39, at 169-70. For
example, Venezuelan observer and the Iraqi delegate commented that the prohibitions "should be
deleted in order to allow States to consider such reservations as they might wish to enter," and that
they "should be deleted in order to allow member States to express relevant reservations according
to their national legislation." Id. paras. 23 & 27, respectively.
65. Bills Convention, supra note 6, art. 88(2). See, e.g., id. para. 3 1(f) (comment of the Finnish
delegate, that "from the point of view of the practice of private law as covered by the Convention,
it would be almost impossible for those dealing in instruments to keep track, at all stages, of all the
reservations that could be made").
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delegations. Among the former reservations are the Sales Convention's article
that permits a Contracting State to declare that it will not be bound by article
l(l)(b) of the convention 66 and the Bills Convention article that authorizes a
Contracting State to apply the convention only when the place where the bill is
made and the place of payment are situated in Contracting States. 67 Examples of
reservations preserving particular doctrines include the Limitation Convention's
article that authorizes a Contracting State to exclude "actions for annulment"
from the convention's scope 68 and the Sales Convention's provision permitting
a Contracting State to declare that it will not be bound by the convention's
provisions dispensing with formal requirements.6 9 Unless one also counts the
federal State clause as a reservation, only one reservation appears in the same
form in more than one convention: both the Limitation and Sales Conventions
authorize Contracting States that have closely related legal systems to exclude
application of the conventions to contracts between enterprises situated in these
States. 70
D. RELATION TO PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
The most consistently difficult issue addressed in each convention is its rela-
tion to prior and subsequent conventions. The new conventions replace or com-
plement prior conventions dealing with the same subject matter. To the extent
they are intended to replace these earlier conventions, the new conventions must
deal with the transition to the new regime. In any event, the new conventions
usually attempt to define their relation to other existing conventions, to amend-
66. Sales Convention, supra note 5, art. 95. Art. l(1)(b) makes the Sales Convention applicable
"when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State."
67. Bills Convention, supra note 6, art. 88(1). Art. 2(l) provides that only one of the two places
must be situated in a Contracting State.
68. Limitation Convention, supra note 3, art. 35. As explained in the official commentary, some
legal systems require that the nullity of a contract be determined by an initial "action for annulment."
Commentary on the Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods,
A/CONF.63/17, reprinted in [1979] X UNCITRAL Y.B. 145, 171.
69. Sales Convention, supra note 5, arts. 12, 96. Eighth meeting of the First Committee, paras.
9-66, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C. I/SR.8, reprinted in Sales Convention, supra note 5, at 271-75;
Third meeting of the Second Committee, paras. 1-23, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C.2/SR.3, reprinted
in Sales Convention, supra note 5, at 443-45. During the UNCITRAL deliberations representatives
of planned economies, such as the U.S.S.R., insisted on this reservation because of their domestic
rules requiring formalities as a way to control economic planning. Report of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its eleventh session, Annex I, paras. 17-27,
195-96, U.N. Doc. A/33/17, reprinted in [1978] IX UNCITRAL Y.B. 11, 31, 33, 45; Report on
Trade Law, tenth session, supra note 21, Annex I, paras. 115-134, at 11, 25, 33-34.
70. Limitation Convention, supra note 3, art. 34, as amended by art. IV of the 1980 Protocol;
Sales Convention, supra note 5, art. 94.
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ments to these conventions, to projected conventions, and to subsequent con-
ventions generally.
The most technically complex and politically sensitive of these problems is to
define the new convention's relation to predecessor conventions. Both the Ham-
burg Rules7 1 and the Sales Convention72 are intended to replace prior conventions
altogether, while the Bills Convention is to coexist with several different uniform
substantive law and conflict of laws regimes.7 3 Although the Limitation Convention
had no predecessor, its drafters had to wrestle with whether to adopt the definition
of "contracts of international sale of goods" found in earlier sales conventions.
Solutions are not uniform. Article 31 of the Hamburg Rules requires Con-
tracting States to denounce the 1924 Hague Rules, but, after intensive debate, the
conference added a proviso that allows a Contracting State to defer the denun-
ciation for a maximum period of five years.74 The Sales Convention also requires
Contracting States to denounce the 1964 Hague Sales Conventions, but does not
allow a Contracting State to defer the denunciation. 75As an interim measure, the
Limitation Convention also authorized a Contracting State that was a party to an
earlier sales convention to substitute the earlier convention's definition of "con-
tracts of international sale of goods" for the definition in the Limitation Con-
vention until the earlier convention was superseded.76
Faced with the more difficult problem of having to coexist with both a
broader substantive uniform law convention and several conflict of laws conven-
tions, the Bills Convention allows the parties to these other conventions to
determine the relation of these existing conventions to the new convention. 77
During the UNCITRAL debates on the draft Bills Convention the Japanese
71. The Hamburg Rules will replace the Hague Rules, as amended. See supra note 4.
72. The Sales Convention will replace the 1964 Hague Sales Conventions. Convention relating
to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, 834 U.N.T.S. 107 (1972); Convention relating
to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 834 U.N.T.S.
169 (1972) [hereinafter Hague Sales Formation Convention].
73. Convention providing a Uniform Law for Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, June 7,
1930, 143 L.N.T.S. 257; Convention for the Settlement of Certain Conflicts of Laws in Connection
with Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, June 7, 1930, 143 L.N.T.S. 379; Inter-American
Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes, and Invoices,
1975, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 332 (1975) [hereinafter Panama Conflicts Convention].
74. Hamburg Rules, supra note 4, art. 31(4).
75. Sales Convention, supra note 5, art. 99(3)-(6). Subart. (6) directs the depositary to consult
with the Government of the Netherlands to ensure that the Sales Convention will come into force
when the denunciation becomes effective.
76. Limitation Convention, supra note 3, art. 38. By its own terms, art. 38 no longer has any
effect now that the Sales Convention has come into force. Id. art. 38(2).
77. See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its
twentieth session, para. 222, U.N. Doc. A/42/17 (1987), reprinted in [1987] XVIII UNCITRAL Y.B.
3, 26 [hereinafter Report on Trade Law twentieth session] ("It was generally agreed that the problem
could be solved only by an agreement among the parties to the Geneva and Panama Conventions that
those Conventions were not to apply to instruments drawn or made in accordance with the UNCI-
TRAL Convention").
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delegate suggested that article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties would resolve any conflict. 78 The suggestion elicited no support. Ac-
cording to the French delegate: "[T]he provision in question was more suitable
for Judges of the International Court of Justice at The Hague than for the judges
of domestic commercial courts. It was essential to regulate the matter by means
of a clear provision, drafted in precise and habitual terms."
79
In addition to dealing directly with these earlier conventions, the Limitation
and Sales Conventions adopt a more general formula. Article 37 of the Limita-
tion Convention provides: "This Convention shall not prevail over conventions
already entered into or which may be entered into, and which contain provisions
concerning the matters covered by this Convention, provided that the seller and
buyer have their places of business in States parties to such a convention." 80 The
For comments on the relation of the Panama Conflicts Convention, supra note 73, and the Bills
Convention, supra note 6, see the comments of the Uruguay delegate at the 1988 meeting of the Sixth
Committee. Summary record of the tenth meeting of the Sixth Committee, paras. 38-41, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/43/SR. 10 (1988), reprinted in [1988] XIX UNCITRAL Y.B. 212.
78. Summary Records of 378th meeting of UNCITRAL, paras. 17-19 U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/SR.378, reprinted in [1987] XVIII UNCITRAL Y.B. 166 [hereinafter 378th Meeting of
UNCITRAL]. Art. 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides:
Art. 30. Application of successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter
1. Subject to art. 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the rights and obligations
of States parties to successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter shall be
determined in accordance with the following paragraphs.
2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as
incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail.
3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the
earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, the earlier
treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the
later treaty.
4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one:
(a) as between States parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in paragraph 3;
(b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the treaties,
the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights and obligations.
5. Paragraph 4 is without prejudice to article 4 1, or to any question of the termination or
suspension of the operation of a treaty under article 60 or to any question of responsibility
which may arise for a State from the conclusion or application of a treaty the provisions
of which are incompatible with its obligations towards another State under another treaty.
Relying on subart. 4, the Japanese delegate proposed the following solution:
If, for example, State A and State B were parties to both the new UNCITRAL
Convention and the Geneva Conventions, State C was a party only to the new UN-
CITRAL Convention and State D only to the Geneva Conventions, then, as between
State A and State B, the UNCITRAL Convention would be applied predominantly and
the Geneva Conventions only to the extent that their provisions were compatible with
those of the UNCITRAL Convention; as between State A and State C, only the new
UNCITRAL Convention would be applied; and as between State A and State D only
the Geneva Conventions would be applied.
378th Meeting of UNCITRAL, supra note 78, para. 18, at 166.
79. 378th Meeting of UNCITRAL, supra note 78, para. 26, at 167.
80. Limitation Convention, supra note 3, art. 37. Art. V of the 1980 Protocol, supra note 3,
deletes the 1974 text and substitutes verbatim the language adopted in the Sales Convention: "This
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substance of the text can be traced to a suggestion by the U.S.S.R., which was
apparently concerned about the relation between the proposed convention and the
General Conditions of Delivery of Goods adopted by the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance. 8 1 With slight amendments to the wording and punctua-
tion, the Sales Convention adopts this formula, 82 but neither of the other con-
ventions does so in such general terms. Using virtually the same language, the
draft Bills Convention provided that it shall prevail over prior and subsequent
conventions, but, as noted above, the U.N. Commission decided to leave the
issue to States that are parties to the earlier conventions, and it therefore deleted
the draft article. 83 This decision means, of course, that there is no provision in
the Bills Convention with respect to future international agreements.
The Hamburg Rules do not adopt a general formula, but article 25 of the Rules
does identify laws, either specifically (for example, the Vienna Convention of 21
May 1963 on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage) or generally (for example,
conventions or national law relating to the limitation of liability of owners of
seagoing ships), that the new convention is not intended to replace. 84 Although
only article 25(5) of the Hamburg Rules explicitly recognizes that subsequent
amendments to a specific class of existing conventions will also prevail over the
Hamburg Rules, 85 this same principle is implicit in the previous subarticles,
which can be read as designations of issues not governed by the Hamburg
Rules.
86
Article 25(5) of the Hamburg Rules itself has a politically charged history. It
was originally proposed as a separate article that would make the Hamburg Rules
Convention shall not prevail over any international agreement which has already been or may be
entered into and which contains provisions concerning the matters governed by this Convention,
provided that the seller and buyer have their places of business in States parties to such
agreement."
81. Analysis of replies to the questionnaire, and comments made at the fourth session of the
Commission by Governments, on the length of the prescriptive period and related matters: report of
the Secretary-General, § 14, para. 65 & n.6, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/70/Add.2, reprinted in [1972] III
UNCITRAL Y.B. 96, 97 & 108.
82. Sales Convention, supra note 5, art. 90. The principal amendment to the Limitation Con-
vention text is to substitute "any international agreement" for "convention." See second meeting of
the Second Committee, paras. 21-31, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C.2/SR.2, reprinted in Sales Con-
vention, supra note 5, at 439-40.
83. Note by the Secretariat, supra note 14, art. 82, at 99. For the UNCITRAL disposition of this
draft article, see Report on Trade Law, supra note 77, paras. 219-222, at 25-26; 378th Meeting of
UNCITRAL, supra note 78, paras. 1-37, and 379th Meeting of UNCITRAL, supra note 22, paras. 1-9.
See also supra note 80.
84. Hamburg Rules, supra note 4, art. 25.
85. ld. art. 25(5) provides:
Nothing contained in this Convention prevents a Contracting State from applying any
other international convention which is already in force at the date of this Convention
and which applies mandatorily to contracts of carriage of goods primarily by a mode
of transport other than transport by sea. This provision shall also apply to any sub-
sequent revision or amendment of such international convention.
86. Id.
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subject to both prior and subsequent multimodal conventions. 87 The issue be-
came acute because the First Committee adopted a definition of "contract of
carriage by sea" that made the convention applicable to multimodal transport
"only insofar as it relates to the carriage by sea. ' 88 By article 25(5) the con-
ference accepted the need to define the relation of the Hamburg Rules to existing
conventions. As to conventions that might be concluded in the future, however,
delegates from Third World nations objected on the ground that the proposal was
an attempt to undermine the results of the Hamburg Rules. As the Philippines
delegate is reported to have stated:
To prejudge the application of a future independent convention was unsound, a legal
contortion. He thought that the real reason behind the proposals by the supporters of the
inclusion of the article-Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan and Norway,
among other developed countries-was that they would prefer to be governed by the
future multimodal convention as a means of reducing the impact of the Hamburg
Convention which was being brought into existence in order to remove the inequities
of the 1924 Brussels Convention.
89
After disentangling existing from future conventions, however, the Second Com-
mittee ultimately decided, with little opposition, to omit any reference to future
multimodal conventions.
90
E. REVISION AND AMENDMENT
Only the Hamburg Rules provide explicitly for revision and amendment of the
rules. Article 32 of that convention provides:
Article 32. Revisions and amendment
1. At the request of not less than one third of the Contracting States to this Con-
vention, the depositary shall convene a conference of the Contracting States for revising
or amending it.
87. The draft text submitted to the Hague conference includes three alternatives. Text of the
Provisions of the Draft Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea Concerning Implementation,
Reservations and Other Final Clauses Prepared by the Secretary-General, art. [ I Multimodal Trans-
port, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.89/6 and Add. I and 2, reprinted in Hamburg Rules, supra note 11, 15.
The Second Committee considered the alternatives and additional amendments at its seventh through
tenth meetings. Report of the Second Committee, paras. 40-42, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.89/1 1, reprinted
in Hamburg Rules, supra note 4, at 125, 131-32. The conference discussed the resulting draft text
at its ninth plenary meeting. Ninth plenary meeting, paras. 1-24, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.89/SR.9,
reprinted in Hamburg Rules, supra note 4, at 183-84. The conference approved the draft text but
transferred it to art. 25 as a subarticle. At the time of these debates in 1978, UNCTAD was at work
on a multimodal convention, which a diplomatic conference adopted in 1980. United Nations Con-
vention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods, U.N. Doc. TD/MT/CONF/17 (1980).
88. Hamburg Rules, supra note 4, art. 1(6); Report of the First Committee, art. 1(5), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.89/10, reprinted in Hamburg Rules, supra note 4, at 70, 71-74.
89. Eighth meeting of the Second Committee, para. 14, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.89/C.2/SR.8,
reprinted in Hamburg Rules, supra note 4, at 395.
90. Ninth meeting of the Second Committee, para. 33, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.89/C.2/SR.9,
reprinted in Hamburg Rules, supra note 4, at 398.
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2. Any instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession deposited after
the entry into force of an amendment to this Convention is deemed to apply to the
Convention as amended.91
In addition, article 33 provides a separate, complex mechanism for revising the
limitation amounts set out in the substantive article that defines limits of
liability.
92
Although the Secretariat had not included an article on revision and amend-
ment among the final clauses it had drafted, four delegations to the conference on
the Hamburg Rules submitted draft articles addressing the issue. 9 3 The most
controversial of these proposals was the requirement suggested by the Norwegian
and German Democratic Republic delegates that a large number (for example,
two-thirds) of the Contracting States adopt an amendment before it would come
into force, but once it did come into force the unamended Convention would
cease to have effect. The U.S.S.R. delegate objected that it was for the future
conference to decide procedures for amendment and to define the relation be-
tween the amendment and the convention. 94 While agreeing with this principle
of respect for State sovereignty, the French delegate also noted the practical
difficulty faced by States that might not approve the amendments, but wanted to
remain parties to the unamended convention. 95 These arguments carried the day,
and the proponents withdrew their draft proposals on these points. The Second
Committee did, however, adopt the proposal that ultimately became article 32,
and, although a substitute proposal that would have allowed any Contracting
State to initiate consideration of review was submitted to the plenary, the con-
ference made no changes.
96
Rather surprisingly, given that the 1964 Hague Sales Conventions expressly
provide for revision97 and given the interest expressed at the Hamburg confer-
91. Hamburg Rules, supra note 4, art. 32.
92. Id. arts. 6, 26, & 33.
93. Report of the Second Committee, para. 53, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.89/1I1, reprinted in Ham-
burg Rules, supra note 4, at 133. The Second Committee considered these proposals at its eleventh
meeting. Eleventh meeting of the Second Committee, paras. 51-97, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.89/C.2/11 ,
reprinted in Hamburg Rules, supra note 4, at 404-08 [hereinafter Eleventh Meeting].
94. Eleventh Meeting, supra note 93, para. 59.
95. Id. para. 62.
96. Ninth plenary meeting, paras. 43-58, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.89/SR.9, reprinted in Hamburg
Rules, supra note 4, at 186-87. The proposal for substitute articles was submitted by Bangladesh,
India, Kenya, Mauritius, Pakistan, Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, and United Republic of Tanzania.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.89/L.2, reprinted in Hamburg Rules, supra note 4, at 143.
97. Art. XIV of the 1964 Hague Sales Convention, supra note 72, at 115-17 provides in part:
1. After the present Convention has been in force three years, any Contracting
State may, by a notification addressed to the Government of the Netherlands, request
the convening of a conference for the purpose of revising the Convention or its Annex.
Notice of this request shall be given to all Contracting States by the Government of the
Netherlands, which shall convene a conference for the purpose of such revision if,
within a period of six months from the date of such notice, at least one quarter of the
Contracting States notify the said Government of their agreement with the request.
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ence, the UNCITRAL deliberations with respect to the Limitation and Sales
Conventions do not address the issue of revision specifically. As noted above,
however, each of these latter conventions does include an article that states that
the convention will not prevail over international agreements that are subse-
quently entered into covering the same subject matter.98 It would seem, 99 there-
fore, that Contracting States may modify these conventions by protocols adopted
following internationally recognized procedures and with the consequences dic-
tated by international law. 100 Regional arrangements or commodity agreements
may also derogate from these conventions.
This procedure was followed without objection when the U.N. General As-
sembly charged the Sales conference to consider also a draft protocol to conform
the Limitation Convention to the Sales Convention. 'o' The protocol adopted at
this 1980 conference not only amends the final provisions of the 1974 text to
conform with the Sales Convention, 10 2 but also includes its own final
provisions. 103 Articles X and XI of the protocol state that, unless it declares
otherwise, a State that becomes a party to the convention after the protocol
comes into force is a party to the convention as amended, but that it will be a
party to the unamended convention as to Contracting States that do not agree to
the amendment. By defining the relation of the amended convention with the
unamended text, the protocol satisfies objections made at the Hamburg confer-
ence and establishes a precedent for future revisions.
IV. Conclusions
Neither the procedures for adoption of the final provisions of the UNCITRAL
conventions nor the contents of these articles are perfunctory. For all the con-
ventions the U.N. Commission delegated to the Secretariat the task of drafting
See art. XII of the Hague Sales Formation Convention, supra note 72. These articles, however, have
not been used because the creation of UNCITRAL has made the revision process they envisage of
little practical importance. See also Evans, Article 90. para. 3.2, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTER-
NATIONAL SALES LAW 638 (C. Bianca & M. Bonell eds. 1987) ("the [Sales] Convention contains no
provision regarding its possible revision, wisely perhaps in view of the unhappy fate reserved to the
revision clauses contained in the 1964 Hague Conventions").
98. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
99. Evans, supra note 97, at 636.
100. See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, arts. 39-41. Art. 40(4) states that the amending
agreement binds Contracting States only if they agree to the amendment, while art. 40(5) provides
that a State that becomes a party to the convention after the amendment comes into force is deemed
to be a party to the amended convention except that it is deemed to be a party to the unamended
convention with respect to Contracting States that have not agreed to the amendment.
101. G.A. Res. 33/93, para. 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/l (1978), reprinted in Sales Convention,
supra note 5, at xiii.
102. For example, art. V of the Protocol, supra note 3, modifies art. 37 of the 1974 text. See
supra note 80.
103. Protocol, supra note 3, arts. VII-XIV. Following the classification adopted in this essay, these
final provisions include housekeeping rules (arts. VII-IX, XIII, XIV), an authorized reservation (art.
XII), and rules defining the relation between the Protocol and the earlier convention (arts. X, XI).
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most, if not all, of the final provisions. After some hesitation with the Limitation
Convention, the U.N. Commission decided that with respect to these articles it
should defer to the diplomatic conference to be convened. Each conference
assigned review of these articles to its Second Committee, where recorded de-
bate subjected most provisions to careful scrutiny. This pattern was broken,
however, when the U.N. Commission decided not to convene a special confer-
ence to consider the draft Bills Convention. There are no recorded debates with
respect to the final provisions in the U.N. General Assembly or the Sixth Com-
mittee, and it was necessarily the U.N. Commission that reviewed the draft
articles. If this procedure is adopted for subsequent conventions, it may mean
that review of these final provisions will be less intensive. Fewer States may be
represented at UNCITRAL meetings, and these representatives may be more
conversant with the substantive private international law articles than with the
public law final clauses.' 4
While procedures may become less settled, however, there appears to be a
growing consensus on the content of these final provisions. As a consequence,
intensive review of these provisions may be less necessary. Certainly, agreement
on the content of most housekeeping provisions, such as articles prescribing
rules for ratification or accession, appears to have been reached. There also
seems to be agreement on the appropriate formulation of a federal State clause
and on the need to prohibit reservations other than those expressly agreed upon
in the convention.
More problematic are the relations between the new convention and prior or
subsequent international agreements. While the Limitation and Sales Conven-
tions adopt a general formula disclaiming priority over these earlier or later texts,
debate at the Hamburg conference suggests that the formula may not be accept-
able if it is perceived as a threat to compromises reached in the convention before
the conference. Nor is there agreement on the need to address specifically the
issue of revision and amendment of the convention. Reluctance to tie the hands
of States at future conferences is the principal justification for omitting provi-
sions dealing with revision. Yet the successful revision of the Limitation Con-
vention at the 1980 Sales conference provides a procedural and substantive
precedent for future revisions.
Many of these issues are also covered by the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties. Reference to the Vienna Convention has been most persuasive with
respect to housekeeping matters. Given the detail of the Vienna Convention's
restatement of the functions of the depositary, for example, it was successfully
104. Thirty-six States are members of UNCITRAL. Representatives of non-member States would
be "observers" only. While the Commission might give these representatives the floor and while
most issues are resolved without a formal vote, it may be more difficult to obtain financing to attend
a non-diplomatic conference as an observer. Moreover, it may be less likely at an UNCITRAL
meeting than at a diplomatic conference that persons knowledgeable about public international law
will be members of the delegations.
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argued that the UNCITRAL conventions need not provide similar detail. But
citation to the Vienna Convention has not always been dispositive. On the
question of whether the UNCITRAL conventions should expressly prohibit fur-
ther reservations, the pragmatic argument prevailed that business enterprises
need more guidance than provided by the Vienna Convention's general prohi-
bition of reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of a convention.
Similarly, when it was suggested that article 30 of the Vienna Convention re-
solved a complex issue with respect to the relation between the Bills Convention
and prior conventions, one delegate commented that "the provision in question
was more suitable for Judges of the International Court of Justice at The Hague
than for the judges of domestic commercial courts." The Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, in other words, is considered suppletory, filling in details
when the UNCITRAL commercial law conventions are silent.
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